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1 Introduction
Because intermediaries buy goods from producers and resell them to consumers, they
are necessarily involved in a double competition, competition on inputs as well as
competition on outputs. Stahl (1988) made a signicant contribution to the under-
standing of this complex double-sided competition by modelling a two-stage game
of price competition among merchants. In particular, he develops an interesting se-
quential Bertrand competition game in which the competition for inputs takes place
before the competition for output, and intermediaries are compelled to buy all the
supply o¤ered by producers. Stahl shows that such a sequential competition can gen-
erate two di¤erent outcomes. If the Walrasian asking price to consumers is higher
than the sales-revenue-maximising price, the game displays the Walrasian equilib-
rium, conrming that trade organised through competing intermediaries is equivalent
to a centralised trading system with a benevolent auctioneer. However, if the Wal-
rasian asking price is lower than the sales-revenue-maximising price, the outcome of
the game is di¤erent from the Walrasian equilibrium and depends on the rule that is
applied when merchants post the same price for the inputs. If intermediaries share
equally the market in the case of a tie, an equilibrium fails to exist. Alternatively, if
one intermediary is randomly allocated the whole market, the equilibrium is charac-
terised by an excess capacity, where some inputs are bought from producers but not
resold to consumers.
Stahls model of double Bertrand competition applies to any type of intermediation
where intermediaries compete by prices in their input and output markets. It is
not only a relevant framework to analyse competition among supermarkets/dealers
reselling goods bought from the producers to the consumers, as Stahl does in his
paper but Stahls modelling has some interest for the nancial markets as well. Indeed
double Bertrand competition also applies to competition among intermediaries in the
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primary nancial markets, in which the institutional investment rms buy the newly
issued nancial products (like Treasury and companies bonds/bills) from the issuers
in need of funds and resell them to the nal investors (like households). This double
Bertrand competition is a relevant structure as well for the modelling of banking
intermediation, where retail banks borrow funds from savers, mainly through deposits,
and lend them to borrowers. This competitive structure in the banking area has been
analysed in the literature by Yanelle (1989), Freixas and Rochet (1997), Toolsema
(2001) and Bracoud (2002).
The original paper by Stahl assumes that the merchants actual revenue per unit
of sale equals the asking price to consumers, which requires that all customers entirely
pay their bills to the intermediary. The present paper aims at generalising Stahls
analysis by capturing the possibility that some consumers may default on their pay-
ments to the intermediary. As a consequence, the average revenue per unit of good
among the pool of customers could be less than the asking price, contrary to the
assumption made in Stahls original paper.
For banking intermediaries, possible default by borrowers is indeed a core feature
of their lending business and has been a research eld for many years. (See Freixas
and Rochet (1997) for an overview). The interest of modelling default by consumers
however goes much beyond the case of banking intermediation as default has become
a relevant concept for many other markets that now allow deferred payments by
consumers. It is indeed a widespread practice for many big retailers of furniture
and white goods to provide their customers with the option to pay months after
the delivery of the good, often without any interest being charged. This facility has
become a signicant feature of competition among providers of durable consumption
goods, as reected in retailers advertisements in the media. The delay between
the delivery and the payment does not need to be very long to generate a possible
default. In primary and secondary nancial markets, the delay between the delivery
of a nancial product and its nancial settlement is enough for the intermediaries to
bear the risk not to receive the totality of the posted price when reselling nancial
products.1
To capture such default risk on payments, the current paper assumes that the
expected revenue per unit of sale depends not only on the price posted but also on
the probability of default by consumers. An interesting case is that of an increasing
default probability. The average probability of default may increase with the asking
price for several reasons. Firstly, if a given unexpected shock in consumers budget
had to occur between the delivery and the payment, it would be more di¢ cult to
1One can actually extend the argument to any intermediary that accepts cheques as a means of
payment as the bank may have to reject the cheque if the clients account is not in credit at that
time and this may translate into a default for the intermediary.
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honour the payment if the good were more expensive. Secondly, a moral hazard
e¤ect can take place: dishonest consumers are more ready to bear the risk of judicial
problems related to a break in their payments if the gain to be made (if they manage
to get away with it) is higher. Thirdly, an adverse selection e¤ect could also operate
by keeping the best customers outside the market when the price increases, and
therefore decreasing the average quality of the market (Akerlof (1970), Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981)). These three mechanisms, operating individually or in combination,
can generate an expected revenue per unit of sale that is a non-monotonic function
of the posted price: the expected revenue per sale eventually decreases, because the
decrease in the average probability of payment more than o¤sets the increase in the
asking price.
The present paper shows that the introduction of default leads to three mutually
exclusive congurations, depending on the characteristics of the demand and supply
functions for the good. The three possible outcomes of our framework are illustrated
in Figures 1-3. As in Stahls original paper, we get a case (illustrated in Figure 1)
where there is no subgame perfect equilibrium in the game. However the introduction
of default paradoxically makes this result less likely to occur than in the model by
Stahl. Our framework could also generate a Walrasian equilibrium like in the original
paper, which is represented in Figure 2. In this case the Walrasian asking price is
higher than in the case with no default and the Walrasian bidding price is lower. More
importantly, the non-monotonicity of the expected revenue per unit of sale, induced
by consumersdefault on payments, introduces a new form of ine¢ ciency where con-
sumers are rationed, as illustrated in Figure 3, a situation that could not arise in
Stahls framework. This result is in line with Stiglitz and Weiss(1981) pioneer work
on adverse selection and moral hazard in the loan market, where it is shown that
credit rationing could be an outcome of asymmetric information. When applied to
banking intermediation, the game-theoretical framework of double Bertrand compe-
tition that we develop in the current paper can therefore be seen as a formalization
of the Stiglitz and Weiss rationing story. When applied to the markets of durable
goods, the framework gives us some interesting insights on the possible consequences
of introducing some facilities for the customers of delaying payments.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the model, Section 3 char-
acterises the Nash Equilibrium (NE) in the output subgames, which is the rst step
in solving our problem by backwards induction, and Section 4 denes the Subgame
Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) of the whole game. Section 5 discusses the results
and concludes.
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2 The Model
Let S(p) be the aggregate supply by producers when o¤ered a price p, with S(0) = 0
and S 0 > 0. Let D(p) denote the aggregate demand by consumers when facing an
asking price p. Demand is characterised by D0 < 0 and for prices higher or equal to
pmax, demand is zero. The expected revenue per unit of sale is  (p) = [1  q (p)] p
where q (2 [0; 1]) is the average probability of default in the pool of customers. Note
that if q = 0,  = p as in Stahls original paper. We analyse the case where q0 > 0,
with limp!0 q = 0 and limp!pmax q = 1. The expected revenue per unit of sale  is
therefore concave, takes the value zero for p = 0 and p = pmax, and has a unique
global maximum at p = pa.
The sequence of the game is as follows: at stage 1, two intermediaries simulta-
neously post a bidding price pib with i = 1; 2; at stage 2, producers choose their
intermediary, the latter having the obligation to accept their entire supply; at stage
3, intermediaries with the stocks formed at stage 2 post an asking price pia; at stage
4, consumers choose their intermediary; at stage 5, intermediaries reject some con-
sumers if their stocks are insu¢ cient. Rationed consumers can then visit the other
intermediary. In the case of tied bidding prices, producers are assumed to distrib-
ute equally among intermediaries, as it is a more realistic assumption than the rule,
also used in Stahls paper, by which a middleman would be chosen randomly to get
the whole market. We assume a proportional rationing scheme for excess demand,
although this type of rationing is not essential for our results to hold. 2 The residual
demand facing the high-priced merchant 1 when the competitor has a capacity x is
therefore RD(p1a; p
2
a; x) = maxf0;gD(p1a) with  = D(p
2
a) x
D(p2a)
.
We denote by pmca (pb) the asking price that guarantees market clearing for a given
bidding price pb, i.e. S(pb) = D(pmca ). The combinations (pb; p
mc
a ) are represented
by g(pb) in Figures 1-3, which splits the space into prices generating excess demand
on the left-hand side and prices creating an excess supply on the right-hand side. If
producers are aware of the default problem the Walrasian prices are the combination
(pWb ; p
W
a ) such that S(pb) = D(pa) and pb = (pa). This special point is located at
the intersection of g and the dotted curve pb = (pa) in Figures 1-3. 3
Let us now represent in Figures 1-3 the combinations of prices such that  (pa)Q 
pbS (pb) = 0 where the actual sales Q are such that Q = min fD (pa) ;S (pb)g. These
2Proportional rationingis also called sometimes random rationingas in Stahls paper, referring
to customers arriving in random order and being served on a rst-come, rst-served basis. In the
remainder of the paper we will refer to proportional rationing, as it is the usual terminology used in
the IO literature.
3Without default as in Stahl, the Walrasian prices are dened to be the combination of prices
such that S(pb) = D(pa) and pb = pa. This point would be therefore located at the intersection
between g and the 450 line.
5
combinations correspond to either a zero monopoly rent when only one intermediary
is active in the market, or an aggregate zero prot when the two active merchants
post exactly the same prices. The zero-monopoly-rent curve, represented in bold in
the gures, is built by adding two parts of two distinct curves: we take the part of
the dotted curve pb = (pa) located on the left-hand side of g (excess demand) and
the part of the solid curve (pa)D(pa) = pbS(pb) situated on the right-hand side of g
(excess supply). We assume that paD(pa) is concave and consequently has a global
maximum, denoted by bpa. This implies that the expected sales revenue with the
non-monotonic revenue, (pa)D(pa), also has a unique global maximum (although
associated with a lower revenue), located at bbpa, which is necessarily lower than pa.
As already mentioned in the introduction, Figures 1-3 represent the three mutually
exclusive congurations that may arise in our model, characterized by a di¤erent
SPNE for the game. Conguration 1 refers to the case pWa < bbpa. Because of the
non-monotonicity of  the opposite case pWa > bbpa, contrary to Stahls analysis, gives
rise to two sub-cases: pWa < pa (conguration 2) and p
W
a > pa (conguration 3).
We solve the sequential game by backwards induction in order to determine the
SPNE of the model: Section 3 identies the Nash equilibria asking prices in the second
part of the game (the output subgames covering stages 3 to 5) for every possible
conguration of bidding prices and capacities inherited from the rst two stages of
the game. Section 4 then solves the rst stage of the game, and nds the Nash
equilibrium bidding prices taking into account the consequences of intermediaries
decisions in terms of bidding prices for the rest of the game.
3 The NE in the output subgame
When analyzing the output subgames, we take the bidding prices of intermediaries and
their capacities in terms of inputs as given. Two possible types of output subgames
emerge: those coming from a situation where one player has posted a more attractive
bidding price than its competitor and is therefore a monopoly in the subgame; and
those emerging from intermediaries having posted the same bidding prices in the
previous stages of the game with therefore equal capacities.
Before analyzing the two types of subgames, let epb denote the highest possible
bidding price compatible with a non-negative prot, therefore the highest pb located
on the bold zero-monopoly-rent curve.
Firstly, consider the subgames where one intermediary has posted a more attrac-
tive bidding price than its competitor in stage 1 (still lower than epb), thereby receiving
the entire supply x = S(pb), and beneting from a monopolist position in the output
market. The NE is consequently the monopoly asking price subject to a capacity con-
straint x, i.e. the middle value among bbpa, pa and pmca .The proof is given in Appendix
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A.
Secondly, let us consider subgames where both intermediaries have posted the
same bidding price pb  epb in stage 1. When competing for consumers in stage 3,
each merchant has the same capacity constraint equal to x = S(pb)
2
and a xed total
cost of pb
S(pb)
2
. The market-clearing asking price pmca is obviously dependent on pb, for
a higher bidding price is associated with a lower pmca . Depending on the level of pb in
the output subgame considered, pmca s relative position with respect to bbpa and pa (the
latter parameters being independent of the subgame considered) may be di¤erent.
A priori three rankings could emerge in the output subgames. As we will see later,
depending on which conguration prevails (gures 1-3), not all three rankings we
analyse below may be relevant. The proofs of NE in the output subgames dened
below are detailed in Appendix B.
Low pb necessarily generates the ranking bbpa < pa < pmca . This conguration leads
to a NE in the output subgame at pa, characterized by demand rationing. This case
is a direct consequence of the non-monotonicity of .4 For higher bidding prices, we
could get bbpa < pmca < pa. In this scenario the NE in the output subgame is the
market-clearing asking price pmca . Finally, as soon as the bidding price is large enough
to drive pmca below bbpa, there is no NE in the subgame any longer.
Let now relate the three subgames outcomes described above to the congurations
in Figures 1-3. As already mentioned, the above rankings may not all be relevant for
the three gures: indeed it may depend upon the position of the lowest market-
clearing price compatible with nonnegative prot, pmca (epb) relative to bbpa and pa. In
conguration 3, pmca (epb) = pmca ((pa)), which is necessarily higher than bbpa and pa.
Therefore in all subgames where intermediaries post the same bidding price, only
the rst ranking ever applies, generating demand rationing at pa. In conguration
2, pmca (epb) = pWa , which is between bbpa and pa. The rst two rankings therefore occur
and subgames with the same bidding prices can therefore be characterized either by
demand rationing or market clearing. Finally Conguration 1 has a market-clearing
asking price that could decrease to below the Walrasian level, and therefore below pa
and bbpa. As a result, conguration 1 covers the three rankings and therefore displays
the following outcome across subgames: demand rationing; market clearing; and
inexistence of equilibrium.
Let us denote by pEb the maximum bidding price posted by both intermediaries for
which a NE in the related subgame exists, i.e. pmca (p
E
b ) =
bbpa. It is depicted for each
conguration in Figures 1-3. In conguration 3, no problem of existence ever arises.
As a result, in this conguration, pEb = epb = (pa). In conguration 2, no problem of
4Without default, as in Stahls framework, the market-clearing price of the subgame pmca is always
lower than pa(= pmax).
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existence arises either, thereby pEb = epb = pWb . In conguration 1, the range of highest
bidding prices generates an absence of NE and consequently pEb (< p
W
b ) < epb.
4 The SPNE of the game
Knowing the payo¤s for all subgames starting at stage 3, we can now solve the rst
stage of the game, where competition for inputs takes place. Competition in the
input market necessarily drives the bidding price to the highest value compatible
with equilibrium in the subgame, i.e. pEb . For any other lower price indeed, one
intermediary would have an incentive to deviate by o¤ering a slightly higher bidding
price in order to achieve a monopolist position in the output market. The discrete
jump in quantities that this deviation represents will always more than o¤set the
negative e¤ect in terms of inputs costs. To put this formally: (pa)minfD(pa);S(pb+
)g   (pb + )S(pb + ) > (pa)minfD(pa)2 ; S(pb)2 g   pb S(pb)2 .
We now check if there is any possible deviation from pEb , our unique candidate
as a SPNE. There is none for congurations 2 and 3. Since pEb is also equal to epb in
these congurations as shown at the end of the previous section, it is indeed never
protable for an intermediary to deviate from pEb through an increase in the bidding
price, for there is no asking price able to generate a positive prot at all. Price pEb will
e¤ectively be a SPNE in congurations 2 and 3. In conguration 1, however, pEb is
lower than epb, and therefore there is some protable deviation from pEb by increasing
the bidding price. This conguration actually does not display any SPNE at all, as
the only way to avoid a deviation would be to bid epb, for which however there is no
NE in the related output market subgame.
We summarise our results below:
Proposition If pWa < bbpa < pa (conguration 1), the sequential game does not admit
any SPNE. If bbpa < pWa < pa (conguration 2), the SPNE of the game is the Walrasian
outcome (
 
pWa

; pWa ). If bbpa < pa < pWa (conguration 3), the SPNE is ( (pa) ; pa)
and displays demand rationing.
When an equilibrium exists, it is characterized by zero prot in line with standard
results in a Bertrand environment. Note that in the case of a tie, if the goods were
allocated to a single intermediary chosen randomly rather than distributed equally
among intermediaries, the inexistence result for conguration 1 would be replaced
by a SPNE at (pEb ;bbpa), with some of the stocks bought by intermediaries being not
resold to consumers. As already mentioned, we do not think that this is a reasonable
assumption.
8
5 Discussion and Conclusion
The outcome of nonexistence of equilibrium (or excess capacity if a single intermediary
is randomly allocated the whole market) corresponding to conguration 1 will arise for
fewer congurations of demand and supply functions than in the no-default case like
Stahl. Indeed, some demand and supply functions could lead to pWa < bpa in Stahls
framework whereas the introduction of default in the same environment could generate
the opposite ranking with pWa > bbpa. This reduction in ine¢ ciency stems from the loss
of revenue per unit of good generated by the default of some consumers - (pa) < pa
- which pushes the Walrasian asking price up compared to Stahls framework.5
AWalrasian equilibrium is also a possible outcome of our framework (conguration
2). However due to the default on payment theWalrasian asking price is higher than in
Stahls framework whereas the Walrasian bidding price is lower. There is undeniably
a loss of e¢ ciency: Consumers and producers end up worse o¤, and the level of
transactions at equilibrium is less than that in the absence of default.
More importantly, we have demonstrated that another form of ine¢ ciency arises
in our framework (conguration 3), taking the form of a SPNE with demand rationing
in situations where the Walrasian outcome would have emerged in the no-default case
like Stahl. Default itself is not enough to generate such an outcome. Our result
of demand rationing also requires the non-monotonicity of the unit receipt. The
monotonicity of  (even with  < pa due to default) would not be su¢ cient to create
demand rationing because the asking price generating the highest expected revenue
per unit of sale would be pmax, and therefore the Walrasian asking price would be
always lower that this maximum, ruling out conguration 3.
When applied to banking intermediation, where banks compete for deposits and
loan applicants, our framework recasts the seminal analysis of credit rationing by
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) in a game-theoretical framework where double competition
is explicitly modelled.
Our framework also provides some interesting insights on the consequences of
delayed payments in the white goods and other durable goods markets. It seems that
the market is currently in conguration 2, since no demand rationing is observed.
However consumers should be aware that they pay a higher price as a result of this new
facility. Our framework also predicts that, should the practice of delaying payment
intensify, the industry of durable goods for households might well experience some
demand rationing in the future, as shown in conguration 3.
5It may also occur (but not necessarily) that the sales-revenue-maximising asking price in presence
of default is lower than the one with full repayment, i.e., bbpa < bpa. This second e¤ect, should it
happen, would complement the e¤ect due to a higher Walrasian and possibly reverse the ranking.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A: The monopolist equilibrium in the output subgames
In subgames with an intermediary with all goods from the producers (x = S(pb)), the
monopolist chooses pa in order to maximise the expected sales (pa)minfD(pa);S(pb)g.
Recall that pmca is such that D(p
mc
a ) = S(pb), bbpa maximises (pa)D(pa) whereas pa is
the maximum of (pa)S(pb) with bbpa < pa.
For pa  pmca the supply is binding and therefore maximizing the sales consists in
maximizing (pa), S(pb)being constant. The argmax is therefore minfpmca ; pag.
For pa  pmca the demand is binding and therefore maximizing the sales involves
maximizing  (pa)D (pa). The argmax is therefore max
n
pmca ;
bbpao.
The nal stage is to nd which of the two asking prices dened above generates
the highest sales over the whole range of pa.
 If pmca  bbpa  pa then minfpmca ; pag = pmca and maxfpmca ;bbpag = bbpa. Given that
[(pmca )D(p
mc
a )]
0  0 therefore bbpa maximises the sales.
 If bbpa < pmca  pa then min fpmca ; pag = maxnpmca ;bbpao = pmca . Therefore pmca
maximises the sales.
 Finally if bbpa  pa < pmca then minfpmca ; pag = paand maxfpmca ;bbpag = pmca . Given
that [(pmca )S(pb)]
0 < 0 therefore pais the maximum.
7.2 Appendix B: The Nash equilibria in the output subgames
Let us consider any bidding price lower than or equal to epb.
 We rstly show that the bidding price generating the ranking bbpa < pa < pmca
leads to a NE at pa with demand rationing.
We rule out as equilibria all situations with an excess of inputs (pa > pmca ), since an
intermediary could protably decrease the asking price: the deviating intermediary
would capture all consumers and get sale revenue for some otherwise unused inputs.
There is both an increase in  (as the asking price is on the negative slope of ) and
in the quantities sold, for min
n
S(pb)
2
;D (pa   ")
o
> D(pa)
2
.
Nor can we accept as equilibria situations in which pa < pa  pmca . An intermedi-
ary could deviate by o¤ering a lower asking price to increase its unit sale revenue 
while keeping the inputs supply S(pb)
2
as the binding side.
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Lastly, we reject as equilibria situations in which pa < pa < p
mc
a . An intermediary
could deviate by o¤ering a higher asking price to increase its unit sale revenue  while
keeping the inputs supply S(pb)
2
as the binding side.
From pa characterized by demand rationing, there exists no deviation as  is at
its maximum.
 Secondly, we show that if pmca becomes lower than pa generating the rankingbbpa < pmca < pa the NE is pmca .
As already explained, we can rule out all situations in which there is an excess of
supply (pa > pmca ), since an intermediary could protably deviate by decreasing the
asking price. Although there may be a decrease in the unit sale revenue, the deviating
intermediary registers a discrete jump in the quantity sold, which more than o¤sets
the possible innitesimal decrease in . Indeed, starting from a situation with excess
of supply, ( (pa   ")min
n
S(pb)
2
;D (pa   ")
o
>  (pa)
D(pa)
2
:
Nor can we accept any situation with demand rationing (pa < pmca ). An inter-
mediary can o¤er a higher asking price, which increases its unit sale revenue , and
still provides enough residual demand to guarantee that the input quantity is bind-
ing: RD (pa + ") = D (pa + ")
h
D(pa)  12S(pb)
D(pa)
i
. The rationing ratio being a positive
constant depending only on the initial situation, RD is strictly decreasing in ". As at
the initial pa, RD is equal to D (pa)   12S (pb) > 12S (pb), there exists an " such that
the input side is still binding for the deviating intermediary.
From pmca it is impossible to deviate through a decrease in the asking price: 
would decrease and the quantities could not increase since the amount of inputs is
binding.
We now analyze whether pmca is robust to a deviation through an increase in
the asking price. Let us dene the residual demand that an intermediary would
face through an increase in the asking price. Given that the other intermediary
posts the market-clearing asking price, the residual demand that the deviating inter-
mediary (with the less attractive asking price) faces is exactly the aggregate de-
mand for the good (at this less attractive price) divided by 2. Indeed, RD =
D (pmca + ")
D(pmca )  12S(pb)
D(pmca )
. As D (pmca ) is equal to S (pb), this residual demand is ex-
actly equal to 1
2
D (pmca + ") and remains binding. It is important to ask at this point
if  (pmca + ")
1
2
D (pmca + ") is higher or lower than  (p
mc
a )
1
2
D (pmca ).
6 As pmca is higher
than bbpa, the deviating intermediarys sales revenue is unambiguously decreased, so
6We can use the conguration of sale revenue (computed with total demand) which has the same
shape as the sales revenue of an individual intermediary (after sharing the total demand among 2
intermediaries) in order to conclude as to whether the sales receipts of the deviating intermediary
are increased or decreased.
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that the deviation is not protable. The market-clearing price is then the NE of the
subgame.
 Thirdly for pmca lower than bbpa, we get the ranking pmca < bbpa < pa. There is no
NE in the subgame.
Any excess of supply or demand can be ruled out for the reasons explained previ-
ously in the second point. From pmca , sales revenue increases through an increase in
the asking price: indeed as pmca < bbpa;  (pmca + ") 12D (pmca + ")>  (pmca ) 12D (pmca ) : See
previous point for the equivalence between residual demand and half the demand at
the new price.
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8 Figures
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Figure 1: Conguration 1 where pWa < bbpa < pa displaying absence of equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Conguration 2 where bbpa < pWa < pa displaying Walrasian equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Conguration 3 where bbpa < pa < pWa displaying demand rationing.
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